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Abstract
We investigate whether the costs of job displacement differ between
blue and white collar workers. In the short run earnings and em-
ployment losses are substantial for both groups but stronger for white
collars. In the long run, there are only weak effects for blue collar
workers but strong and persistent effects for white collars.
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1 Introduction
The loss of a job is certainly shaking up someone’s career temporarily, but
might also be a long-term problem. To which extent does the type of a
worker’s job affect the costs of displacement? Theoretical arguments suggest
that losing a job associated with firm-specific human capital is more costly
in terms of reduced lifetime earnings than losing a job where pay is closely
aligned with a worker’s general human capital. Similarly, workers who are
displaced from manual work, maybe with piece rate compensation, are less
likely to suffer substantial lifetime earnings losses than those displaced from
their career path on internal labor markets associated with deferred payment
contracts.
This paper looks at displacement costs for two broad occupational groups:
white and blue collar workers. Arguably, firm-specific human capital, internal
labor markets, and career concerns are more important in white than in blue
collar jobs. When displacement costs are driven by loss of firm-specific rents
we should observe higher displacement costs for white than for blue collar
workers. (Lazear, 1979)
The issue has not been resolved in the literature: The authors in the book
by Kuhn (2002) compare displacement costs across a number of countries and
find no difference for earnings losses across education categories. Displace-
ment costs with respect to unemployment are mixed: In the U.S., Canada,
France and Belgium, more educated workers (who are more frequently found
in white collar jobs) tend to suffer less from joblessness after displacement,
the reverse is true for Germany.
We use exceptional administrative data, the Austrian Social Security
Database (ASSD), to shed new light on the issue. This data set has four
main advantages: First, it covers the universe of Austrian employees in the
private sector. Second, it contains high-quality and high-frequency infor-
mation on the individual workers’ earnings and employment history over an
extended period of time. Third, it contains an employer identifier that allows
us to identify plant closures. Fourth, the Austrian white/blue collar is a legal
(and historically determined) definition, which follows closely the distinction
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relevant in theories of firm-specific human capital and internal labor mar-
kets. Furthermore, as Austrian blue and white collar workers are subject to
different social security rules measurement error in occupational status can
be ruled out.
Taking plant closures as an indicator for exogenous job separations we
can identify the causal effect of displacement on worker’s future careers. Our
empirical strategy exploits the rich nature of our data and applies exact
matching techniques which makes treatment and control groups extremely
well comparable.
2 Data
Our data comprise all private sector workers in Austria covered by the social
security system.1 All employment records can be linked to establishment
identifiers. We use quarterly information from 1978-98 for daily employ-
ment and wages. This information is highly reliable, because social security
payments hinge on these data.
We use workers employed between 1982 and 1988 at risk of a plant clo-
sure. This allows to observe workers’ earnings and employment histories 4
years prior to potential displacement up to 10 years afterwards. We restrict
the analysis to prime-age workers (age 35 - 50) with at least one year of
tenure, who were employed in firms with more than 5 employees at least in
one quarter during the period 1982-88, excluding construction and tourism
industry.
White and blue collar workers are defined according to administrative
rules: white collar workers comprise all clerical workers and higher non-
clerical (manual) occupations, including salespersons (excluding waiters and
salespersons in bakeries, etc.); blue collar workers are typically manual work-
ers. As white collar workers enjoy better sick leave and redundancy pay
regulations our data, which are from the social security administration, are
very exact.
In the ASSD, each establishment has an identifier. Exits of establishments
1See Zweimu¨ller et al. (2009) for a description of the data.
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occur when the employer identifier ceases to exist. Some of these cases might
not be true closures and (most of the) employees just continue under a new
identifier. Therefore, we impose a further restriction: If more than 50% of
the employees continue under a new employer identifier we do not consider
this to be a closure.
Our treatment group comprises 9,656 workers who experienced a plant
closure between 1982 and 1988. Our group of potential control observations
comprises about 1 million workers from establishments not going bust during
this period. To increase the comparability between treated and controls, we
perform exact matching between treated and control subjects on the following
criteria: sex, age, location of firm (9 provinces), industry (30 industries),
employment history in the eight quarters before plant closure.2 We do almost
exact matching on continuous variables: average daily wages in the quarters
8, 9, 10 and 11 before plant closure are matched by decile group3 and plant
size two years before plant closure is matched by quartile groups. Applying
this matching procedure allows us to identify at least one control subject for
5,570 treated subjects, which are matched to 30,156 controls.
3 Econometric Strategy
To estimate the effect of an involuntary job loss on earnings and employment
prospects we specify the following model
Yi,t = α+ β1,20BLUEiPCiQ
1,20
i,t + β21,40BLUEiPCiQ
21,40
i,t
+ γ1,20BLUEiQ
1,20
i,t + γ21,40BLUEiQ
21,40
i,t
+ δ1,20PCiQ
1,20
i,t + δ21,40PCiQ
21,40
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+ λ1,20Q
1,20
i,t + λ21,40Q
21,40
i,t + µi + θt + ²i,t; (1)
Yi,t denotes the outcome variable (employment status or earnings) of individ-
ual i at quarter t, BLUEi is a dummy variable indicating whether individual
2See Ichino et al. (2007) for a detailed description of the matching algorithm.
3We do not match earnings close to closure, because of anticipatory wage effects. See
Jacobson et al. (1993) for evidence on such effects.
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i is a blue collar worker, PCi is another dummy indicating whether individual
i got displaced due to a plant closure and the Qi,t’s are two dummies indicat-
ing the time period relative to plant closure (actual or potential). To keep
the problem manageable and results easily interpretable, we focus on two
post-displacement periods: the “short-run”, defined as the first five years (20
quarters, Q1,20i,t ) after potential displacement; and the “long-run” as years 6-
10 after potential displacement (Q21,40i,t ). Moreover, specification (1) includes
a constant term, α, individual fixed effects, µi, calendar time effects, θt and
an error term, ²i,t.
The parameters of interest are β1,20 and β21,40. They identify, for short-
and long-run labor market outcomes, whether blue collar workers suffer more
(β1,20 < 0, β21,40 < 0) or less from a plant closure than white collars.
4 Results
Figure 1 visualizes the evolution of earnings and employment by occupation
and displacement status. Panel A shows employment profiles for displaced
(treated) and non-displaced (control) white collar workers. The graph shows
mean employment rates per quarter over 14 years – 4 years before and 10
years after potential displacement. By construction, employment rates are
equal to unity in the year prior to potential displacement. Employment
rates at earlier dates show that our matching procedure works well: During
quarters -16 to -5 employment rates of treated and controls are identical.
Immediately after displacement employment rates for the treated white collar
workers decrease sharply. Only about 50 percent find a new job during
the first quarter after displacement. Employment rates catch up during the
first two years and decrease thereafter but never reach the level of the non-
displaced.
Panel B shows the corresponding picture for blue collar workers. The im-
mediate loss in employment rates after displacement is somewhat higher for
displaced blue collars. However, displaced blue collars recover much faster
and, about 6 years after displacement, reach a level only slightly below the
employment of non-displaced blue collars. In sum, the graphical analysis
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shows that employment losses of displaced white collar workers are perma-
nent and strong. In contrast, employment losses for displaced blue collars
are more temporary and small in the long run.
Panels C and D portray the analogous phenomenon for the evolution of
mean nominal daily earnings, conditional on employment. Obviously, this
measure changes over time due to increases in real earnings, in inflation and
because the set of employed workers changes. As in panels A and B, we see
a remarkable difference between white and blue collar workers. Wages for
displaced blue collar workers are only slightly below those of non-displaced
blue collars throughout the post-plant closure period. In contrast, earnings
profiles of displaced white collars are substantially below those of their non-
displaced colleagues and remain so throughout the post-plant closure period.
Table 1 presents regression results from equation (1), both for employ-
ment and daily wages. Columns (1) and (2) use employment status and
the wage as dependent variables. Individual fixed effects and dummies for
calendar time are included.
Displaced white collar workers face substantial employment losses equal
to a .231 reduction in the employment probability (coefficient of PCiQ
1,20
i,t ) in
the short-run and a .137 reduction (PCiQ
21,40
i,t ) in the long-run. Displacement
effects for blue collars are much more moderate: employment probabilities
decrease by .149 (-.231 + .082) in the short-run and by .046 (-.137 + .091)
in the long-run.
Blue-white collar differences in earnings losses are even more striking.
Column (2) shows that earnings losses for displaced white collar are large
both in the short-run (-.079 log points, coefficient of PCiQ
1,20
i,t ) and in the
long-run (-.078 log points, PCiQ
21,40
i,t ). In contrast, blue collar workers’ earn-
ings drop by only .023 log-points (-.079 + .056) in the short-run and by
negligible .006 log-points (-.078 + .072) in the long-run.
These findings are contrary to previous evidence for the US. Podgursky
and Swaim (1987) explicitly consider a white-blue collar comparison and
find lower earnings losses for white collars. The analysis in Podgursky and
Swaim (1987), however, is based on comparing pre-post earnings differentials,
while our empirical strategy takes counterfactual developments into account.
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This might partly reconcile the difference in findings as in the absence of
displacement blue collar workers face a less favorable evolution of wages and
employment probabilities, which can be seen in rows 5 and 6 of table 1.
5 Conclusion
We investigated whether costs of job displacement differ by the nature of the
job. Our findings suggest that both white and blue collar workers experi-
ence a decrease in employment and earnings in the short-run. However, for
white collar workers these detrimental short-run effects are much stronger.
Moreover, for blue collar workers employment losses are modest and earnings
reductions are negligible in the long-run. In contrast, white collar workers
experience strongly negative employment and earnings effects also in the long
run.
The distinction between blue and white collar workers follows the Aus-
trian legal definition which matches the distinction relevant in theories of
firm-specific human capital and internal labor markets. Typically, blue-collar
workers have less discretion at work than white collars, their output is more
easily observable and they are more likely to be paid piece rates. Blue-collar
workers are typically employed in manual jobs, are directly involved in the
production process. In contrast, white-collar workers are non-manual work-
ers in supervising and administrative jobs. Therefore we believe that the
most plausible explanations for our findings are theories of firm-specific hu-
man capital and internal labor markets. These theories would predict that
a job loss results in higher employment losses for white collars who are more
likely to be employed in jobs where firm-specific human capital, career con-
cerns and internal labor markets are relevant. Alternative explanations such
as rent-sharing theories and union-power are probably less relevant as blue-
collar workers are at least as well organized as white-collars both within firms
(in works councils) and economy-wide (in unions organized at the industry
level).
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Table 1: Estimation results
Employment Earnings
(1) (2)
BLUE*PC*Q01,20 .082 .056
(.01)∗∗ (.01)∗∗
BLUE*PC*Q21,40 .091 .072
(.014)∗∗ (.012)∗∗
PC*Q01,20 -.231 -.079
(.006)∗∗ (.007)∗∗
PC*Q21,40 -.137 -.078
(.008)∗∗ (.008)∗∗
BLUE*Q01,20 -.019 -.031
(.004)∗∗ (.004)∗∗
BLUE*Q21,40 -.056 -.041
(.008)∗∗ (.006)∗∗
Q01,20 -.033 .023
(.003)∗∗ (.003)∗∗
Q21,40 -.12 .027
(.005)∗∗ (.004)∗∗
Const. .96 5.678
(.015)∗∗ (.012)∗∗
Obs. 2033304 1748184
R2 .453 .883
F statistic 104.854 561.717
All regressions include individual fixed effects and calendar time dummies. Dependent
variables are an employment dummy in column 1 and log daily earnings in column 2.
Clustered standard errors reported in parenthesis.
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Figure 1: Employment and Earnings
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